On the effectiveness of control-flow integrity against modern attack techniques by Sayeed, Sarwar & Marco-Gisbert, Hector
 UWS Academic Portal
On the effectiveness of control-flow integrity against modern attack techniques
Sayeed, Sarwar; Marco-Gisbert, Hector
Published in:
ICT Systems Security and Privacy Protection
DOI:
10.1007/978-3-030-22312-0
E-pub ahead of print: 05/06/2019
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication on the UWS Academic Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Sayeed, S., & Marco-Gisbert, H. (2019). On the effectiveness of control-flow integrity against modern attack
techniques. In G. Dhillon, F. Karlsson, K. Hedstrom, & A. Zúquete (Eds.), ICT Systems Security and Privacy
Protection: 34th IFIP TC 11 International Conference, SEC 2019, Lisbon, Portugal, June 25-27, 2019,
Proceedings (pp. 331-344). (IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology; Vol. 562). Springer
International Publishing AG. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22312-0
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the UWS Academic Portal are retained by the authors and/or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with
these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact pure@uws.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the
work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 17 Sep 2019
On the Effectiveness of Control-Flow Integrity
Against Modern Attack Techniques
Sarwar Sayeed[0000−0002−9164−7672] and
Hector Marco-Gisbert[0000−0001−6976−5763]
University of the West of Scotland, Paisley, United Kingdom
{sarwar.sayeed,hector.marco}@uws.ac.uk
Abstract. Memory error vulnerabilities are still widely exploited by at-
tackers despite the various protections developed. Attackers have adopted
new strategies to successfully exploit well-known memory errors bypass-
ing mature protection techniques such us the NX, SSP, and ASLR. Those
attacks compromise the execution flow to gain control over the target
successfully.
Control-flow Integrity (CFI) is a protection technique that aims to erad-
icate memory error exploitation by ensuring that the instruction pointer
(IP) of a running program cannot be controlled by a malicious attacker.
In this paper, we assess the effectiveness of 14 CFI techniques against
the most popular exploitation techniques including code reuse attacks,
return-to-user, return-to-libc and replay attacks.
Surveys are conducted to classify those 14 CFI techniques based on the
security robustness and implementation feasibility. Our study indicates
that the majority of the CFI techniques are primarily focused on re-
stricting indirect branch instructions and cannot prevent all forms of
vulnerability exploitation. Moreover, we show that the overhead and im-
plementation requirement make some CFI techniques impractical.
We conclude that the effort required to have those techniques in real
systems, the high overhead, and also the partial attack coverage is dis-
couraging the industry from adopting CFI protections.
Keywords: CFI Protection Techniques · CFI Attacks.
1 Introduction
Cyber Security is a changing platform, where new defense advances are being
evolved every moment to cope with the ongoing challenges. Due to continuous
changes in the attacking methods, a protection technique often remains outdated
and having required to come up with something more advanced. From the past
few decades, code-injection attack was most significant to corrupt the control-
flow of a program. To meet such attacking challenges, various strong protection
techniques were introduced by security developers. However, in-time the attack-
ers have advanced their ability to corrupt control-flow in a more efficient way;
hence, it was imperative to introduce another protection technique which would
mitigate such leading threats.
CFI was first initiated by Microsoft in 2005 to obstruct the control-flow
exploitation challenges. CFI is a security policy which can be implemented to
mitigate various levels of severe attacks that mainly occurs to corrupt the control-
flow of a program. To accomplish an attack, an adversary goes through various
attacking stages where obtaining control over the IP is the very first step of
the vulnerability exploitation. A compromised control-flow may lead to vari-
ous exploitation techniques, such as Code-reuse attacks (CRA), Code injection,
return-to-libc. Protection techniques such as Stack Smashing Protector (SSP),
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) and Non-executable (NX) bit
are some mechanisms that are present in all modern systems, but unfortunately,
recent attacking techniques are improved to bypass all those protection mecha-
nisms [23].
The main contributions of this paper are:
• We analyze 14 CFI techniques revealing their main features and weaknesses.
• We show the competence between hardware and software based CFI imple-
mentation.
• We conduct a survey to classify the CFI techniques based on attacks that
can bypass them.
• We summarize the performance overhead revealing which of the CFI tech-
niques are prohibitive because of the overhead introduced.
The paper is organized as follows; section 2 is the background section which
discusses control-flow transfers, attacks, and integrity. Section 3 defines various
attack vectors that subvert the control-flow of a program. In Section 4, we review
14 CFI techniques and point out the limitations associated with each technique.
Section 5 involves analyzing software and hardware-based CFI techniques and
produces a solution by debating which techniques are more protective against
control-flow attacks. In addition to that, the impact of performance overhead is
also discussed. Finally the concluding section 6, which summarizes the findings
and discusses future work.
2 Background
To comprehend the complete control-flow mechanism this section describes types
of control-flow transfers and attacks adhering to them. CFI method and its
effectiveness towards control-flow attacks are also discussed.
2.1 Control Flow Transfers
Control-flow transfers can be direct or indirect. Direct control-flow transfer com-
prises read-only permissions; hence, these types of transfers are more secure and
protection is implemented by the memory management unit (MMU). Whereas
indirect control-flow transfer relies on run-time information; such as register or
memory values. In a control-flow attack, attackers tend to divert the indirect
control-flow to their chosen location to perform arbitrary code execution [32].
2.2 Control flow attacks
A control-flow attack is a run-time exploitation technique which is performed
during a run-time state of a program [13]. In this attacking technique, the adver-
sary gets hold of the instruction pointer to divert the execution flow by exploiting
an application’s weakness. It is also used to overwrite the buffer in the stack. Two
major classes of control-flow attacks are mainly performed by random attackers;
Code injection and Code-reuse attack.
2.3 Control Flow Integrity
Control-Flow Integrity is a defense policy intending to restrict unintended con-
trol flow transfers to unauthorized locations [31]. It is able to defend against
various types of attacks whose primary intention is to redirect the execution
flow elsewhere. Many CFI techniques [4, 6, 24, 27–29, 35, 38] have been proposed
over the past few years. However, they were not fully adopted due to practical
challenges and significant limitations.
3 Threats
In this section, we present several attacking techniques utilized by adversaries to
subvert the control-flow. The nature of exploitation strategies and their ability
to perform the attacks are pointed out.
3.1 Code Reuse Attack
Code-reuse attack is an attacking technique which relies on reusing the existing
code [5]. CRA exploitation occurs using codes that are already present in the
target’s application. For instance, the very first step of CRA begins by exploiting
a vulnerability in an application that runs in the targeted system. Once the
vulnerability is discovered, then the target machine can be exploited by malicious
input.
3.2 Code injection
Code injection involves injecting and executing malicious code in the memory
address space [30]. The exploitation can be achieved by providing malicious
payload as input and then get processed by the program. Code injection occurs
when a program bug handles untrusted data. For instance, if a program does not
perform bounds checking of the given input, then an adversary might provide
large data than the actual limit resulting in possible buffer corruption.
3.3 Disclosure Attack
Disclosure attack endorses an attacker to uncover sensitive information, which
may include source code, stack information, passwords or database informa-
tion [19]. This attack vector can be exploited by authenticating users confidential
information and then apply such information to perform further attacks.
3.4 Return-to-user
Return-to-user (ret2usr) overwrites kernel data with user address space [21].
To conduct this attack vector, an adversary gets hold of the return address,
dispatch tables, and function pointers to perform arbitrary code execution. The
ultimate cause involves hijacking the kernel level control-flow to redirect towards
the userspace code.
3.5 Return-to-libc
Return-to-libc occurs by jumping to the function address and allocating argu-
ments [34]. The adversary does not require to inject payload to exploit the target.
It does not overwrite the instruction pointer with an approximate address rather
the IP is overwritten with the function address within the libc library.
3.6 Replay Attack
In this attack, an adversary copies series of data between two users and takes
advantage of the event by communicating with one or both parties [25]. The ad-
versary aims to eavesdrop the exchange of messages or aware of the message rule
from earlier communications between users. Correctly encrypted message, sent
by attackers, is considered as legit request and the necessary task is performed
accordingly.
4 CFI Protection Techniques and Limitations
In this section, we discuss the most relevant CFI techniques that can be used to
prevent control-flow hijacking. In our discussion, we also point out the limitations
associated with individual techniques. Table 1 shows the enforced mechanisms
in each CFI and table 2 represents the essential characteristics related to each
technique.
4.1 CFI Principles, Implementations, and Applications (CFI)
CFI was proposed by Abadi et al. [1, 2] and it is the first CFI proposal for CFI
implementation. They have implemented inlined CFI for windows on the x86
platform. Their work suggests that a Control flow graph (CFG) be obtained
before program execution. The CFG monitors runtime behavior; therefore, any
inconsistency in the program results in CFI exception to be called and appli-
cation to terminate. However, Davi et al. [14] point out three main limitations
of this technique. First, the source code is not always available. Second, bina-
ries lack the required debug information and finally, it causes high execution
overhead because of dynamic rewriting and run-time checks. It is also unable to
determine if the function returns to the current call site [9].
4.2 CCFI: Cryptographically Enforced CFI (CCFI)
CCFI possesses new pointer arrangements, which can not be imposed with static
approaches [24]. It comprises two prime attributes. First, it recategorizes function
pointers at runtime to boost typecasting. Second, it restricts swapping of two
valid pointers which consist of the same type. Nevertheless, CCFI comprises
an average overhead of 52% on all benchmarks. CCFI is vulnerable to replay
attacks [28]. It also fails to identify structure pointers. It is possible to disrupt
the control flow by altering the current pointer with the old pointer. CCFI mainly
focuses on defending the user level program and does not include kernel level
security [24].
4.3 CFI for COTS Binaries (binCFI)
In this technique, CFI is applied to stripped binaries on x86/Linux architecture.
It involves implementing CFI to the shared libraries; for instance glibc [38].
binCFI focuses on overcoming the drawbacks which are highlighted by the static
analysis technique. According to Niu et al. [29], bin-CFI permits a function to
return to every viable return addresses; hence, the accuracy of this CFI is fragile
to Return-Oriented programming (ROP) based attacks.
4.4 Practical CFI and Randomization for Binary Executables
(CCFIR)
CCFIR gathers the legit target of indirect branch instructions and places them
randomly in a “Springboard Section” [37]. CCFIR restricts indirect branch in-
structions and permits them only towards white-list destinations. The average
execution overhead of CCFIR is 3.6% and can be a maximum of 8.6%. It can
be challenging to disassemble a PE file properly. CCFIR utilizes three ID’s for
each branch instruction, excluding the shadow stack. A ROP chain can be built
to subvert CCFIR [27].
4.5 Hardware (CFI) for an IT Ecosystem (HW-CFI)
HW-CFI is a security proposal by NSA information assurance [4]. They put
forward two notional features to enhance CFI. One of the features recommends
implementing CFG to hardware. The other feature protects the dynamic control-
flow by a protected shadow stack. This CFI proposal is a notional CFI design and
might not be compatible with all system architecture. Though shadow stack can
be an excellent option but monitoring shadow stack explicitly might not often
be possible.
4.6 Per-Input CFI (PICFI)
PICFI imposes computed CFG to each input. It is certainly difficult to consider
all inputs of an application and CFG for each of the inputs. Therefore, PICFI
Table 1. Mechanism that is enforced in CFI Techniques
CFI Techniques CFI Enforcement
CFI Inlined CFI
CCFI Dynamic Analysis
binCFI Static Binary Rewriting
CCFIR Binary Rewriting
HW-CFI Landing Point
PICFI Static Analysis
KCofi SVA Compiler Instrumentation
Kernel CFI Retrofitting Approach
IFCC Dynamic Analysis
CFB Precise Static CFI
SAFEDISPATCH Static Analysis
C-Guard Dynamic Instrumentation
RAP Type Based
O-CFI Static Rewriting
runs an application with empty CFG and lets the program to discover the CFG
by itself [29]. PICFI consists overall run-time overhead as low as 3.2%. PICFI
statically computes CFG to determine the edges that will be added on run-
time and implements DEP to defend against code injection. However, statically
computed CFG does not produce a proper result, and various experiments prove
that DEP is by-passable.
4.7 KCoFI: Complete CFI for Commodity Operating System
Kernels (KCoFI)
KCoFI ensures protection for commodity operating systems from attacks, such
as, ret2usr, code segment modification [12]. KCoFI performs its tasks in-between
the stack and the processor. KCoFI includes a conventional label-based approach
to deal with indirect branch instructions. KCoFI consists of about 27% overhead
on transferred file with the size between 1 KB and 8KB and on smaller files it
consists average overhead of 23%. Though KCoFI fulfills all the requirements of
managing event handling based on SVA but the outcome of this CFI enforcement
is too expensive, over 100% [17].
4.8 Fine-Grained CFI for Kernel Software (Kernel CFI)
Kernel CFI implements retrofitting approach entirely to FreeBSD, the MINIX
microkernel system, MINIX’s user-space server and partially to BitVisor hyper-
visor [17]. It follows two main approaches to CFI implementation. The aver-
age performance overhead ranges from 51%/25% for MINIX and 12%/17% for
FreeBSD. Though Kernel CFI cuts down the indirect transfer up to 70%; how-
ever, there still a chance remains for indirect branch instructions to transfer
control to an unintended destination.
Table 2. Key features of CFI techniques.
CFI Based on Compiler Shadow
CFG Label
Coarse Fine Backward
Techniques HW SW Modified Stack Grained Grained Edge
CFI [1,2] 3 3 3 3 3 3
CCFI [24] 3 3 3 3 3
binCFI [38] 3 3 3
CCFIR [37] 3 3 3 3
HW-CFI [4] 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
PICFI [29] 3 3 3 3 3
KCoFI [12] 3 3 3 3 3
Kernel CFI [17] 3 3 3 3
IFCC [35] 3 3 3 3
CFB [6] 3 3 3 3 3
SAFEDISPATCH [20] 3 3 3
C-Guard [26] 3 3 3 3
RAP [18] 3 3 3 3 3
O-CFI [27] 3 3 3 3 3
4.9 Enforcing Forward-Edge CFI in GCC & LLVM (IFCC)
Indirect Function-Call Checks (IFCC), a CFI transformation mechanism, is im-
posed over LLVM. IFCC introduces a dynamic tool which can be used to analyze
CFI and locate forward edge CFI vulnerabilities [35]. The implementation mainly
concentrates on three compiler-based mechanisms. It consists 1% to 8.7% perfor-
mance overhead measured on SPECCPU2006 benchmark. Nevertheless, IFCC
fails to protect against control Jujutsu attack, a fine-grained attacking technique
which aims to execute malicious payload [16].
4.10 Control-Flow Bending: On the Effectiveness of CFI (CFB)
CFB comprises static CFI implementation [6]. It is based on non-control-data
attacks. For instance; if arguments are overwritten directly, then that is consid-
ered as a data-only attack as it did not require to invade the control-flow for such
operation, but if the overwritten data is non-control-data, then it has affected
the control-flow. CFB implements fully-precise static CFG which can be unde-
cidable [16]. CFB also violates certain functions at a high level and execution of
such functions likely to alter the return address and corrupt control-flow [29].
4.11 SAFEDISPATCH: Securing C++ Virtual Calls from Memory
Corruption Attacks(SAFEDISPATCH)
SAFEDISPATCH defenses against vtable hijacking. It examines C++ programs
statically and carries out a run-time check to ensure that the control-flow at
virtual method call sites is not hijacked by attackers [20]. SAFEDISPATCH is
an enhanced C++ compiler and is built based on Clang++/LLVM. The run
time overhead of SAFEDISPATCH is quite low as 2.1% and having a memory
overhead of 7.5%. However, all the compiler based fine-grained illustration un-
dergoes common problems: Shared libraries; as recent programs frequently use
shared library or dynamic loaded libraries [28]. SAFEDISPATCH is also unable
to protect binaries; hence, making them vulnerable to ROP based attacks [27].
4.12 Control Flow Guard (C-Guard)
Control Flow Guard is a highly implemented security mechanism developed by
Microsoft to defense against memory error vulnerabilities [26]. It enhances high
restrictions so that arbitrary codes cannot be executed through vulnerabilities
such as memory buffer overflow. However, it is unable to verify when a function
returns to some unauthorized destination [18].
4.13 Reuse Attack Protector (RAP)
RAP is imposed on GCC compiler as a plugin; therefore, developers do not have
to use a reformed compiler to utilize RAP [18]. RAP has a commercial version,
which comes with two prime defense mechanisms to protect against control-flow
attacks. However, RAP’s implemented approach is very much similar to the
traditional label-based approach. Label based CFI suffers from security issues as
a function could return to any call site. RAP does not have a solid protection
against ret2usr attacks [22].
4.14 Opaque CFI (O-CFI)
O-CFI comprises binary software randomization for CFI enforcement [27]. It
protects legacy binaries without even accessing the source code. CFI checks are
done on Intel x86/x64 memory protection extensions (MPX), which is hard-
ware driven. It consists of a performance overhead of only 4.7%. O-CFI com-
prises static binary phase; therefore, it fails to protect codes that are gener-
ated dynamically. It is also incompatible with the Windows Component Object
Model(COM). Moreover, MPX is much slower than software-based implementa-
tion and not protective against memory based errors.
5 Analysis
In this section, we assess the effectiveness of software and hardware-based CFI
techniques against the threats presented in section 3. The assessment involves
surveying on the security experiments that are done by various research groups
and then put them together to define the flaws. We establish the outcome of
our evaluation by suggesting an optimal security solution and also discuss the
impact of performance overhead towards CFI implementation.
5.1 Software-Based CFI
Software-based CFI enforcement primarily focuses on program instructions, which
are corrupted by indirect branch instructions.
Table 3 shows that CFI [1] does not comprise strong protection and according
to Chen et al. [7], it is possible to execute ROP based attacks while this technique
is deployed. bin-CFI does not comprise shadow stack policy and uses ID/label
Table 3. State of the art of the attacks bypassing CFI
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for each branch instructions. Mohan et al. [27] illustrates that the most recent
experiments prove that label based approaches are also vulnerable to ROP based
attacks
Though CCFIR enhances a security policy that restricts indirect branch in-
structions to predefined functions; however, it misuses external library call dis-
patching policy in Linux and also causes boundless direct calls to critical func-
tions in windows libraries which can be exploited. Moreover, the springboard
section can be exploited by disclosure attacks [14]. PICFI lacks security, and
the control-flow can be compromised by performing three distinguish attacking
stages illustrated by [15]. KCoFI and Kernel CFI are kernel based CFI tech-
niques. KCoFI depends only on the source code; therefore, ensuring minimal
protection to binaries. It also does not provide stack protection; hence, it is
exploitable by various memory error vulnerabilities, such as CRA and memory
disclosure [7]. Beside that, Kernel CFI is able to build a minimal challenge to
defend against ROP based attacks [33]. Table 3 also shows that IFCC is unable
to mitigate control-flow exploitation and can be by-passable by control-flow at-
tack [16]. Though CFB enhances strong CFI enforcement by imposing shadow
stack. However, it is evidenced that it can be by-passable by CFG-Aware At-
tack [36]. SAFEDISPATCH is a compiler based CFI enforcement focuses on
securing indirect calls to virtual methods in C++, and it can also be subverted
by CRA such as ROP [14]. Control Flow Guard fails to protect against indirect
jumps. Moreover, It is fully by-passable by Back To The Epilogue (BATE) at-
tack [3]. RAP makes it very hard for a ROP chain to be built up; however, it is
unable to provide security against ret2usr attacks [22].
5.2 Hardware-Based CFI
Hardware-based CFI enforcement requires the system to have hardware-based
components in place for deployment. Our assessment involves 3 CFI techniques,
which are implemented in both hardware and software. Hardware implementa-
tion is an expensive option as it might not be compatible with the running sys-
tem; hence, it may require to transform the whole system. CCFI requires AES-NI
implementation besides compiler fulfillment. Experiments suggest that AES-NI
can be exploited by replay attack [28]. HW-CFI comprises shadow stack to pro-
tect backward edge and landing point instructions for indirect branch transfers.
In the context of security, this CFI technique will fail to mitigate indirect branch
transfers if implemented. An adversary will be able to direct forward edge to any
landing point instruction causing control-flow corruption [8]. Memory Protection
Extention(MPX) is adopted by O-CFI; however, MPX is not a quick approach
and hits 4x slow down compared to the software approach. O-CFI can also be
exploited by function-reuse attacks [11].
5.3 Optimal Protection
We present that all the 14 CFI techniques comprise major limitations; hence,
they are very much prone to be compromised. Table 3 does not give any indi-
cation on how much effort is required to subvert the individual CFI; however, it
reveals the exploitation method, by providing a reference, related to particular
CFI technique.
Based on our analysis, we are able to identify two software-based CFI tech-
niques, which are more practical and realistic for industry deployment.
CCFIR, a coarse-grained approach, does not rely on weak implementations
such as CFG or shadow stack. Since it involves binary instrumentation; hence, it
does not need source code or debug information. It also protects backward edges
by allowing them only towards a white-list destination. CCFIR avoids most of
the weak implementation classes, which are used in most software-based CFI
techniques.
RAP, a fine-grained approach, has already been adopted by the industry.
A modified compiler is not required to utilize RAP. RAP enhances security by
ensuring that a function is called from a designated place and returned to that
specific function. RAP instruments Linux kernel at compile time to implement
strict CFI at runtime and assures that code pointer are not corrupted by the
adversary.
Though CCFIR and RAP are not a completely secure CFI enforcement tech-
nique; however, they are able to restrict control-flow hijacking to an extensive
level.
5.4 Performance Overhead
Overhead plays a significant part in CFI implementation. Figure 1 presents the
maximum performance overhead of 10 CFI techniques. Distinct CFI techniques
use different platforms to measure execution, performance, and space overhead.
Figure 1 shows that CFI, KCofi, Kernel CFI cause the most overhead ranging
from 27%-51%. CFI enforcement with such amount of overhead is not accepted
and must receive a denial. bin-CFI consists considerable amount of overhead.
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Fig. 1: Performance Overhead of Major CFI Techniques
Hardware-based enforcement, CCFI, comprises 52% overhead raising the ques-
tion if hardware implementation is worth enough beside software implementa-
tion. However, O-CFI another hardware-based implementation comprises only
4.7% overhead. Compiler implemented CFI approaches, such as PICFI, IFCC,
SAFEDISPATCH comprise very low overhead too. CCFIR also consists of very
low overhead, 8.6%.
We evidence that an advanced CFI technique with high overhead may not
be accepted since, besides integrity, performance is an important factor.
6 Conclusions and Future work
In this paper, we have surveyed 14 major CFI techniques. It is clear that each
technique comprises severe limitations and can be subverted by various attack
vectors. It is identified that software-based techniques are more secure compared
to hardware-based techniques and also based on practical implication. They are
easy to implement and does not require an improper architectural requirement.
Based on our findings, we have upheld two software-based techniques, assuming
that they provide enhanced protection in-terms of security. The impact of high
overheads has also been brought out in regards to CFI implementation. Our
survey has established that most CFI techniques are dis-functional to provide
proper security, and as a result, they were not fully acquired by the industry.
Hence, future researches on CFI may consider overcoming the limitations dis-
cussed in this paper to develop a more advanced CFI implementation.
For our future work, we would like to develop a standardized method, which
can be used in comparing and analyzing distinct CFI techniques so that particu-
lar information about CFI techniques and their attack types could be obtained.
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